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The fi nancial protection 
impact of the public 
health system and private 
insurance in Brazil
Antônio M. Bós and Hugh R. Waters
This research assesses the effectiveness of the Brazilian public health 
system and of private insurance in Brazil in providing financial protection 
in health care. The determinants of catastrophic health expenditures 
are estimated by probit regressions with Heckman selection adjustment 
controlling for health-care need. Findings show that the public system 
provides a significant reduction (47%) in the probability of a household 
having catastrophic health expenditures, and that private insurance 
makes such expenditures more likely by 36%. Recommendations include 
improvements in the quantity, accessibility, quality and reliability of public 
providers, more appropriate provision of drugs by the public system and 
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The concept of fi nancial protection in health concerns 
the risk that high health expenditures pose to the 
fi nancial security of vulnerable populations. Households 
may be impoverished because of high levels of spending 
on health care relative to their capacity to pay (Gertler 
and Gruber, 2002; Strauss and Thomas, 1998; WHO, 
2000). Poorer households are less able to manage 
health shocks successfully because they possess fewer 
buffers in the form of liquid assets (Hulme and Shepard, 
2003). A core challenge to development is to improve 
the resilience of poor households to shocks, since this 
will increase income-earning potential, as it encourages 
investment in human capital and in higher-risk, higher-
return activities (World Bank, 2001).
One method for assessing the extent of fi nancial 
protection ability in a health system is to determine the 
proportion of households that have a very high total 
health spending compared to capacity to pay (WHO, 
2000; Waters, Anderson and Mays, 2004). Kawabata, Xu 
and Carrin (2002) propose the term “catastrophic health 
expenditures” when the expenditures exceed 40% of a 
household’s capacity to pay, although different thresholds 
can be used. According to Xu, Evans and others (2003), 
Brazil is the Latin American country with the highest 
proportion of households with catastrophic expenditures 
(10.3%). In a direct assessment of the impact of health 
payments on poverty, Murray, Xu and others (2003) 
measured the difference in the percentage of households 
under the poverty line before and after health payments. 
For Brazil, this difference was 5.1 percentage points, 
amongst the highest for the 59 countries studied.
The high fi nancial burden associated with health 
care in Brazil is at odds with the design —or at least 
the premise— of the unifi ed health system (the Sistema 
Único de Saúde, or SUS), which, in principle, provides 
universal access, with no charge at point of delivery. 
The absence of user fees and other charges should 
reduce, if not eliminate, the fi nancial burden associated 
with health care, with the exception of taxation needed 
to cover the costs of the system. Nevertheless, private 
expenditures for health care exceed public spending 
(PAHO, 2003) and 25% of the population pay premiums 
to purchase health insurance (IBGE, 2000). These 
individuals and families effectively duplicate their 
contribution, indirectly contributing to tax revenues 
to fi nance SUS and directly to complementary health 
insurance schemes. Unlike in other countries, such as 
Chile, individuals cannot “opt out” of public fi nancing 
if they demonstrate private coverage.
The apparent contradiction between the high 
fi nancial burden of health care in Brazil, on one hand, 
and the basic features of the unifi ed health system, on 
the other, highlights the importance of studying the 
determinants of catastrophic health expenditures in 
the country. The ability of the public system to reduce 
the fi nancial burden of health care is one important 
indicator of the performance of the system (WHO, 
2000). This study will attempt to explain the apparent 
contradiction and will provide recommendations on 
how the system might be reformed in order to enhance 
its fi nancial protection capability. The main objective 
of the study is to determine how the unifi ed health 
system, private health insurance and household income 
affect the probability that a household might incur 




The Brazilian context: public health-care system 
and private health insurance
Since the Federal Constitution was approved in 1998, 
Brazil has had a unified health system (SUS) with 
universal coverage, free to all at point of delivery. 
Unlike in most other Latin American countries, access 
is not confi ned to those who participate in the social 
security system. In this case, households do not have to 
decide whether to join SUS before the need for health 
care arises. Care is also delivered through the private 
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supplementary health system. It includes group medicine 
organizations, medical cooperatives, health insurance 
and charitable organizations. Private facilities can also 
be paid directly by patients. Private plan benefi ciaries 
maintain their full right to coverage under SUS. Hence, 
once the need for health care arises, individuals must 
decide whether to use a provider through SUS or through 
their private health insurance plans, or pay directly for 
private care (Bós and Bós, 2004).
For 76% of the population, care is provided 
exclusively by the public system (PAHO, 2005, 13). 
Under the law, the three levels of government —federal, 
state, and local— should participate in the funding and 
operation of SUS, organized in a network that is linked, 
regionalized, hierarchical, and decentralized (PAHO, 
2007, 150). Municipalities have primary responsibility 
for providing health care to their respective populations, 
with technical and fi nancial assistance from the federal 
government and the states.
The term “private insurance” includes market-
based insurance and other pre-payment contracts 
obtained through employment in government or 
government-owned institutions and insurance obtained 
through private employment or directly purchased 
from the insurer. This defi nition is similar to the one 
used by Sekhri and Savedoff (2006). Around 80% of 
supplementary health-care users are served by group 
medicine, medical cooperatives and health insurance 
(Fernández, Pires and others, 2007). Among those 
with private insurance, 57% obtained it through their 
workplace, where employers pay a part of the premium, 
and 43% bought it directly from the insurer. Co-
payments are present in 21% of health plans (IBGE, 
2000). Of the population covered by the supplementary 
system, 75% have coverage from private plans and 
insurance, while 25% are covered by systems for 
government employees.
In 1998, national health expenditure, including 
both public and private spending, was estimated at 
7.9% of GDP. Public spending was 41.2% of the total, 
or 3.25% of GDP. The federal level was responsible 
for 53% of the resources provided, the states for 22% 
and the municipalities for 25%. In the fi rst half of the 
1990s, the absence of stable sources for fi nancing at 
the federal level led to a signifi cant drop in the quality 
of services provided by both public entities and private 
contractors, which did not begin to be reversed until 
1995-1996. The compulsory resources provided under 
Constitution Amendment No. 29 of 2000 regularized 
fi nancial fl ows for the sector to a reasonable degree, 
and this had a signifi cant impact on the capacity for 
medium-and long-term planning (PAHO, 2005, 40).
Table 1 illustrates the extraordinary expansion of 
the public and private health-care network, in particular 
the outpatient network, between 1980 and 1999. The 
number of health facilities without hospitalization 
—ambulatory units— more than tripled during the 
period. This was a clear indication of the beginning 
of a reversal of the once dominant hospital-centered 
model (Escorel, Giovanella and others, 2007; Gershman 
and Santos, 2006). Until the mid-1980s, State-provided 
curative services were concentrated in the cities and 
their hospitals, open only to the minority of workers 
who were employed in the formal sector. As shown 
in the table, in 1980, 33% of health facilities were 
hospitals, whereas in 1999 hospitals comprised only 
16% of health facilities. The table also indicates that, 
whereas most ambulatory units (73%) are public, most 
hospitals (66%) are private. However, nearly 83% of 
the private hospital beds were available to SUS, through 
contract (PAHO, 2005, 14).
The advent of the universal health care system 
has signifi cantly reduced the pre-existing inequality in 
access between different population groups and regions 
TABLE 1
Brazil: health-care facilities, by type of care and provider entity, 1980-1999
Year Health-care facilities with 
hospitalization





Total Public Private Public 
(%)
Total Public Private Public 
(%)
1980 6 110 1 217 4 893 19.9 12 379 8 828 3 551 71.3 67.0
1999 7 806 2 613 5 193 33.5 41 009 29 993 11 016 73.1 84.0
Increase (%) 16 114 6 231 240 210
Source: PAHO (2005).
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of the country. The proportion of poor households 
accessing health services rose by almost half between 
1992 and 2004 (Cornwall and Shankland, 2008). As 
shown in table 2, the regional distribution of hospital 
beds shows a profile similar to the distribution of 
the population. There has been substantial growth 
in the number of consultations and hospitalizations 
per inhabitant in the poorest regions of the country 
(north and north-east). Implementation of SUS also 
led to better distribution of health professionals in the 
country, as shown in table 3. The number of physicians 
per 1,000 people grew 54% at the national level in the 
period 1997-2001. This growth occurred in all regions, 
but signifi cant inequality persisted among regions: the 
south-east, south and centre-west had professionals 
available at levels signifi cantly higher than did the 
north-east and north.
A major initiative to enhance the coverage 
of primary care is the Family Health Programme 
(Escorel, Giovanella and others, 2007), which provides 
comprehensive health care in a particular territory, 
assigning patients to a multi-professional team 
composed of at least one doctor, one nurse, nursing 
auxiliaries, and community health agents. Each health 
team is responsible for some 1,000 families. In 2005, 
the programme was being carried out in 4,837 Brazilian 
municipalities, with 22,683 family health teams 
providing care for approximately 73 million people, 
or 40% of the population (PAHO, 2007, 147). Solla, 
Reis and others (2007) observed that the programme 
has been instrumental in reducing regional inequalities 
in access to primary care.
Major inequalities in the supply of services and 
access to intermediate- and high-complexity health 
care persist among regions. In 2002, 83% of optical 
equipment, 73% of the equipment for radiation therapy, 
74% of magnetic resonance imaging equipment and 
75% of computed tomography (CT) scanners in the 
country were located in the south-eastern and south 
regions of the country (PAHO, 2005, 20-21). These two 
regions comprise 57.4% of the Brazilian population.
Despite the continuing regional disparity, in 
general health indicators have improved signifi cantly. 
Table 4 shows the favourable trend in the rates for 
infant mortality and life expectancy at birth. Abreu, 
César and França (2007) observed that mortality from 
avoidable causes had decreased since SUS began and 
concluded that the decrease was partially due to the 
increase in the availability of and access to health 
services brought about by the reorganization of the 
Brazilian health-care system.
No fi nancial charges are associated with use of 
the public system. However, households might prefer to 
spend money on private providers and health insurance 
(Ribeiro, Barata and others, 2006; Bós, 2007) because 
the public system excludes certain aspects of health 
care (Ocké-Reis, Silveira and Andreazzi, 2002), or 
because of suboptimal quality (Costa and García, 
2003), accessibility, or waiting time (Marinho and 
TABLE 2:
Brazil: distribution of hospital beds and 
population, by region, 1999









Brazil: number of health professionals,
by region, 1997 and 2001
(Per 1,000 inhabitants)
Region Physicians Nurses
 1997 2001 1997 2001
Brazil 1.35 2.08 0.45 0.52
North 0.61 1.12 0.30 0.35
North-east 0.80 1.20 0.35 0.42
South-east 1.86 2.81 0.54 0.60
South 1.36 1.99 0.48 0.59
Centre-west 1.22 2.34 0.37 0.47
Source: PAHO (2005).
TABLE 4
Brazil: infant mortality rate and life 
expectancy at birth, 1991-2006
 1991 2000 2006
Infant mortality rate
(per 1,000) 45.2 30.4 24.9
Life expectancy at birth 66.9 years 70.4 years 73.4 years
Source: IBGE (2006).
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Cardoso, 2007) in public providers. The expansion of 
private health plans in Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s 
was at least partly a function of the poor quality of 
public providers (Alves and Timmins, 2003), which 
deteriorated during the 1980s following a series of 
economic crises, slow economic growth and a shortage 
of public resources (Malta, Cecílio and others, 2004).
Almost all private health plans cover doctor’s 
visits, complementary examinations and hospitalizations 
(PAHO, 2005, 33). According to Fernandes, Pires and 
others (2007), supplementary health operators are 
concentrated in the low-value health plan ranges and 
participants seek plans that provide basic services. 
As in other countries with universal health systems, 
private plans in Brazil tend to exclude the treatment of 
chronic diseases that require prolonged and expensive 
care, and have strict limits on maximum length of 
hospital stay or total spending (Farias and Melamed, 
2003; Pinto and Soranz, 2004; Rocha and Simões, 
1999). From the perspective of the insured household, 
these constraints increase the possibility of catastrophic 
health expenditures, as the household must still rely on 
the public system —while continuing to pay insurance 
premiums— or, if their concerns about quality and 
access are strong enough, pay directly for the care as 
an added expense (Ocké-Reis, 2005). Furthermore, 
there is evidence that these insurance constraints are 
more signifi cant for poorer households, whose benefi t 
packages tend to be more limited (Bahia, 2001). In 
fact, a signifi cant portion of the population covered 
by the supplementary system uses the public network, 
especially for highly complex or costly procedures 
or treatments such as transplants and conditions such 
as HIV/AIDS (Porto, Santos and Ugá, 2006). In these 
circumstances, private health insurance might not be 
effective in reducing health expenditures, especially if 
the household purchases the insurance directly and has 
to pay the full premium.
III
Empirical Model
Health expenditures are classifi ed as catastrophic if they 
exceed a given threshold, such as 40% of household 
income. To estimate this concept we defi ne the binary 
variable CHE (for catastrophic health expenditures), 
which takes a value of 1 when health expenditures 
are above the threshold and 0 when it is below. The 
empirical model is:
 Probability [CHE = 1] = Probability
 [bo + b1.logP + b2.logY + b3.X + u1 > 0]
Here, P is the price of health care, Y is income, 
and X represents the various demographic factors (sex, 
age, race and so forth), health insurance indicators, 
and local health-care infrastructure that might affect 
health spending. This equation attempts to estimate how 
important these explanatory factors are in determining 
the presence of catastrophic health expenditures, and 
will be estimated via probit regression.
If CHE were defi ned as a binary variable without 
any other adjustments, the value of zero would include 
three groups: those who sought health care but for whom 
the level of expenditures was below the threshold, those 
who did not receive health care although they needed 
it, and those who did not have a need for health care 
at all. This strategy is clearly inappropriate: it does not 
distinguish among a favourable outcome (assuming 
that proper health care was provided with expenditures 
below the threshold), an unfavourable one (health 
care not received, although needed), and a neutral 
one (health care not needed). In the present analysis, 
two steps are taken to avoid this. First, the analysis is 
restricted to those who needed health care, as described 
in the next section. Second, we remove from the probit 
estimation the persons that did not seek health care, 
via the Heckman selection model.
Once the analysis is restricted to those who needed 
health care, the lack of selection in the Heckman model 
indicates unmet need: i.e., individuals and households 
that did not seek health care, but needed it. People who 
have a need for health care but do not get it can also 
have a catastrophic event (and this is equally a failure 
of fi nancial protection), but they are not at risk for 
catastrophic expenditures (Waters, 2000). The Heckman 
sample selection model is an appropriate analytical 
model in this case (Dow and Norton, 2003), because 
it is designed to analyse a situation where a potential 
outcome exists—health expenditures by those who have 
chosen to seek care. Because non-care-seeking people 
(with unobserved health expenditures) are likely to be 
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systematically different from care-seeking people (with 
observed expenditures), the estimation is likely to suffer 
from selection bias in the absence of a correction such 
as the Heckman model (Dow and Norton, 2003).
The setup of the Heckman selection model in 
a probit estimation is described below. The specifi c 
implementation of the model, including an account 
of unmet health-care needs in Brazil, is presented in 
section IV.
As in other probit models, it is assumed that an 
underlying relationship exists between a continuous 
variable (y*j) —health expenditures as a fraction of 
household income— and a set of explanatory variables 
(u1j), as specifi ed in the equation below:
 y*j = xj ∃ + u1j  latent equation
In this equation, ∃ is the set of parameters to be 
estimated and u1j are the residuals of the estimation. 
However, we measure the binary outcome (yj 
probit) only 
if the latent variable is above a given threshold (t), as 
given in the equation below:
 yj 
probit = (y*j > t)  probit equation
The dependent variable, however, is not always 
observed, as households might choose not to seek 
health care even if they need it. Rather, the dependent 
variable for observation j is observed if households 
choose to seek health care, as specifi ed in the equation 
below (Van de Ven and Van Pragg, 1981).
 yj 
select = (zj ϑ + u2j > 0) selection equation
In the selection equation, yj 
select is another binary 
variable (1= households sought health care; 0 = they 
did not), zj is a set of explanatory variables for the 
selection decision and ϑ is the new set of parameters 
to be estimated. The residuals of the latent and 
selection equations (u1j and u2j) are normal variables, 
with average equal to zero and standard deviation 
equal to one. The correlation between the residuals is 
expected to be positive and it is measured as rho in 
the estimates below.
To estimate the Heckman model we need variables 
that infl uence the selection (the probability of seeking 
health care), but do not directly affect the ultimate 
dependent variable (the probability of catastrophic 
health expenditures). For this purpose, three indicators 
relating to total health-care infrastructure at the regional 
level are used: the total number of ambulatory units, 
hospital beds, and physicians per capita. These are the 
identifying variables (also called instrumental variables) 
in the model, as they are used in the Heckman selection 
equation but not in the probit equation.
Using the procedures suggested by Murray (2006), 
one of the instruments —the total number of ambulatory 
units per capita— was found to be both “strong”, i.e., 
statistically signifi cant in the selection equation (table 
6) and “valid” (not significant if introduced in the 
main probit equation). As expected, this variable only 
infl uences health-care spending when health care is 
sought. On the other hand, the other two instruments 
were weak under most health-care need defi nitions. 
Further analysis—also suggested by Murray (2006)—
was conducted by repeating the estimations with the 
removal of these weaker instruments. This procedure 
generated no important changes in the results. One 
fi nal observation is that there are weak correlations 
between the instruments used in the selection equation 
and three similar control variables used in the main 
probit equation—number of private ambulatory units, 
hospital beds and physicians per capita.
IV
Data sources and empirical specifi cations
1. Data sources
The present research uses the dataset from the 1998 
National Household Survey conducted by the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The survey 
uses a three-level sampling process: municipalities 
within each state, census tracts and households, 
based on the 1991 census (IBGE, 2000). Adjustments 
necessary to make the results representative for the 
country population in 1998 were based on projections 
of birth, death, and migration rates. The total sample 
size was 112,434 households and 344,975 individuals. 
We controlled for clustering resulting from the survey 
design by defining states as the clusters and using 
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probability weights for each household, as provided 
by the dataset (StataCorp, 2005).
An additional data source is the survey on medical 
and sanitary assistance for 1999 (Ministry of Health 
of Brazil, 2004). Information gathered from this 
source includes the total public and private per capita 
health-care infrastructure, as detailed below. Given 
the aggregation levels of the reported results for the 
National Household Survey dataset, these indicators are 
used at the state and metropolitan area level.
2. Dependent variables
Health expenditures were calculated by adding the 
following expenditures: medicines, health insurance 
premiums —net of any contribution by employers— 
doctor visits, visits to other health-care professionals, 
hospital stays, home-care nursing, tests, dental-care 
fees, glasses and lenses, orthopaedic equipment, and 
other health-care expenses. Since the questions on the 
survey asked about the household’s direct spending, 
these expenditures are expected to include the costs 
associated with co-payments and to take into account re-
imbursements from health insurance plans. These results 
are adjusted to a monthly basis, as the recall period for 
the expenditures was the previous three months with the 
exception of medicines, where the recall period was one 
month. Monthly household income is also available in 
the National Household Survey.
For the probability of the household having 
catastrophic health expenses in a given month (probit 
equation), we estimate three alternative thresholds:
(i)  Total health expenditures equal to or greater than 
20% of income (12% of households surpass this 
threshold);
(ii) Total health expenditures equal to or greater than 
40% of income (3.7% of households);
(iii) Out-of-pocket health expenditures, not including 
private health insurance premiums, equal to or greater 
than 10% of income (20% of households).
These gross estimates of catastrophic health 
expenditures are very similar to the fi ndings of Diniz, 
Servo and others (2007), who used a different dataset: 
that of the Survey of Household Budgets. The 3.7% 
estimated value found using the 40% threshold is 
substantially lower than the 10.3% value reported by 
Xu, Evans and others (2003), and this does not seem 
to be explained by the methodological distinctions 
between the studies. Diniz Servo and others (2007) 
provides a detailed account of how the small sample 
size, the lack of national representativeness, and 
the research objectives of the dataset used by Xu, 
Evans and others (2003) might have led these authors 
to overestimate the extent of catastrophic health 
expenditures in Brazil.
For the selection equation, the dependent variable 
is based on whether anyone in the household sought 
health care in the two weeks prior to the survey. Using 
the broadest defi nition of health care need (“Health-
care need No.1” as defi ned in the next section) we can 
identify three groups:
(i)  Households that did not need health care (52,504 
households, or 58% of the total sample);
(ii)  Households that sought health care (32,895 
households, which is equivalent to 36% of the 
total sample or 86% of those who needed health 
care); and
(iii)  Those households that did not seek health care, 
although they needed it (5,514 households, which 
is equivalent to 6% of the total sample or 14% of 
those who needed health care).
Unmet needs are a signifi cant feature of the survey 
sample, with one in every seven households that needed 
health care not accessing it. Among those households 
that suffered from unmet needs, 31% indicated lack 
of sufficient money, 26% indicated problems with 
scheduling and delay of service, 15% indicated access 
issues, including transportation diffi culties, and 27% 
cited other issues. An interesting feature that arises 
from this dataset is that not actually receiving care, 
after actively seeking it, is not a widespread problem. 
Only 2% of the households that sought care did not 
receive it after multiple attempts. One application of 
these fi ndings is that an analysis of poor access to 
health care in Brazil by Ribeiro, Barata and others 
(2006) underestimates the problem, since it focuses 
on care actually received instead of the decision not 
to not seek necessary care. Similarly, the conclusion 
reached by PAHO (2007, 148) that access to health 
services seems to be assured for the vast majority of 
the Brazilian population is unwarranted.
While the unit of analysis for health expenditures 
is the household, the unit for health-care use is the 
individual. The aggregation at the household level 
is necessary because both income and the benefits 
of some health expenditures —notably the insurance 
premium— are shared amongst household members.
3. Need for health care
We use two alternative defi nitions of the need for health 
care. Health-care need No. 1 indicates households 
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where at least one person needed health care in the two 
weeks before the survey, irrespective of reason. This 
defi nition encompasses 42% of households. Health-
care need No. 2 indicates households where at least 
one person had two or more chronic conditions and 
needed health care in the two weeks before the survey. 
This defi nition encompasses 18% of households.
Given the nature of the data available, the 
characteristics of the public health system and the 
objectives of this analysis, the regressions are confi ned 
to the individuals and households who needed health 
care. Simple logistic regressions on each of these 
health-care need defi nitions indicate how they restrict 
the sample. Given space constraints, detailed accounts 
of these analyses are not provided, but the main results 
are summarized. Under the No. 1 defi nition, need is 
more likely for households with a higher percentage of 
females, households with at least one elderly person, 
larger households, and those in urban areas. Poorer 
households have the same likelihood of needing health 
care as their richer counterparts. 
The results for defi nition No. 2 are similar, with 
more marked importance of female participation 
and the presence of an elderly person, and poorer 
households indicating a greater need for health care 
than richer households. Notably, a health-need gradient 
according to income is lacking in the broader defi nition 
of health-care need (No. 1), but is present in the 
defi nition that incorporates chronic conditions (No. 2). 
These fi ndings suggest that the stronger need for health 
care among poorer households is associated with the 
higher prevalence of chronic conditions in this group, 
as noted by Almeida, Barata and others (2002).
Health-care need was recorded for the previous 
two weeks in the survey, while the health expenditure 
information used to estimate catastrophic expenditures 
was collected for the previous three months (except 
medicines, which were for one month). This difference 
in time periods might have introduced a bias towards 
the individuals and households that had more frequent 
need for health care and, therefore, were more likely 
to be captured by the two-week recall in the survey. 
In this case, this bias is identical to the one introduced 
by restricting the analysis to those who needed health 
care, as discussed above.
4. Explanatory variables of interest
Our primary variables of interest are:
(i)  Whether the household used the Brazilian public 
health system (SUS) for its health-care needs in the 
two weeks previous to the survey (yes = 44% of 
households that sought health care). This variable 
was not used in the selection equation.
(ii)  Whether anybody in the household had private 
health insurance (33.5% of households).
(iii)  Log of monthly family income, in Brazilian reais.
The use of SUS and private health insurance 
aff iliation are not mutually exclusive, as private 
affi liation does not preclude use of the public system. 
Still, among the households that received health care 
and had insurance, only 21% used SUS. This overlap 
between the public system and private insurance 
might affect the results for these two variables. 
However, replications conducted to assess the impact 
of the overlap showed that it did not affect the results 
signifi cantly. Specifi cally, the regressions were estimated 
by removing one of the variables and checking how the 
other variable was affected, and new regressions were 
performed with interaction indicators between them. 
For the sake of brevity, these results are not shown.
Private health insurance might be endogenous 
to health status, as those with worse health might try 
to obtain insurance (adverse selection). The available 
data do not allow this possibility to be ruled out, but it 
does not appear to be likely. For instance, there is little 
relationship between the number of chronic conditions 
and health insurance. Whereas 26% of the individuals 
with no chronic conditions have insurance, 24% of 
those with one condition and 22% of those with two 
conditions have it. Along similar lines, coverage is higher 
among those with excellent or good self-assessed health 
(25.9%) and lower for those with poor or very poor 
self-assessed health (14.5%) (IBGE, 2000). This pattern 
seems to be compatible with insurers’ risk selectivity 
but incompatible with simple adverse selection. In a 
more rigorous analysis of the same dataset used in this 
research, Bahia, Costa and others (2002) concluded that 
adverse selection was not important.
As expected, poorer households are more likely 
to rely on the public health system and less likely 
to have private insurance. Dividing the sample into 
halves, based on per capita household income, 70% of 
the poorest households that received health care in the 
previous two weeks used SUS, whereas only 36% of the 
richest households did so. Only 13% of the poorest have 
insurance coverage, compared with 55% of the richest 
households. These relationships indicate the importance 
of controlling for income when analysing the impact of 
the public system and private insurance on the level of 
health expenditures. All the regressions were replicated 
for the poorer and richer sub-samples. For the sake 
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of brevity, a detailed account of these replications is 
not provided here. In general, they confi rm the main 
fi ndings of the full-sample analysis.
5. Control variables
Table 5 describes the control variables.
TABLE 5
Brazil: control variables
Private health-care infrastructure 
at the state and metropolitan 
levels (only for probit equation)
Number of ambulatory units that do not serve SUS/1000 people
average: 0.06; 
range: 0.01 to 0.22
Number of hospital beds that do not serve SUS/1000 people
average: 0.38; 
range: 0.02 to 0.87
Number of physicians that do not serve SUS/1000 people 
average: 1.3; 
range: 0.08 to 2.79
Demographics
Sex: percentage of females in the household average: 51.7
Race: whether household head is mulatto/mulatta (% of the sample) 39
Race:a whether household head is black (% of the sample) 6.8
Children: whether household has at least one child 10 years old or 
younger (% of the sample)
44
Older persons: whether household has at least one person 65 years 
old or older (% of the sample)
17.4
Education: highest educational attainment in the household, measured 
in years of schooling 
average = 7.8 years
Household size
1 person = 9%
2 persons = 17%
3 to 5 persons = 60%
6 or more = 14%
Whether household lives in a rural area (% of the sample) 16
Health-care prices at the state and 
metropolitan levels Average cost of a hospital stay as approved by SUS
average: 357 reais; range: 
207 to 566 reais
Average value of an ambulatory procedure as approved by SUS
average: 3.3 reais
range: 2.0 to 4.4 reais
Total health-care infrastructure at 
the state and metropolitan levels 
(only for selection equation)
Total number of ambulatory units/1000 people
average: 0.24; 
range: 0.11 to 0.61
Total number of hospital beds/1000 people
average: 3.0; 
range: 1.8 to 4.0
Total number of physicians/1000 people 
average: 4.3; 
range: 0.8 to 6.7
Source: IBGE (2000) and Ministry of Health of Brazil (2004).
a The base category for race is, basically, white (53.5% of sample); other races would be only 0.7% of sample.
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Table 6 shows the results for both the probit and 
selection equations. In the probit equation, marginal 
effects are presented for the probability that a household 
has catastrophic health expenditures if health care is 
sought. In the selection equation, the marginal effect of 
the probability that a household sought health care is 
shown. In both cases, for the continuous independent 




Brazil: results of the regressions

























Probit equationa y=0.232 y=0.074 y=0.378 y=0.347 y=0.142 y=0.546
Income (log) -0.135b -0.077b -0.127b -0.168b -0.118b -0.136b
Whether used SUS  -0.063b -0.035b -0.041b -0.094b -0.058b -0.052b
With health insurance  0.096b  0.027b -0.004  0.140b  0.053b  0.001
Private ambulatory  0.204d  0.045 -0.089  0.385 -0.047  0.137
Private hospital beds  0.100b  0.042c  0.082b  0.106  0.034  0.047
Private physicians -0.028c -0.012 -0.010 -0.030 -0.007  0.003
Female percentage  0.074b  0.027b  0.072b  0.078b  0.031d  0.057b
Race: mulatto -0.052b -0.029b -0.050b -0.071b -0.042b -0.065b
Race: black -0.057b -0.032b -0.048b -0.094b -0.057b -0.080b
With children -0.076b -0.041b -0.111b -0.041b -0.040b -0.054b
With older persons  0.134b  0.063b  0.158b  0.096b  0.059b  0.099b
Highest level of education in household  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.002  0.003c  0.002
Household size -0.005b -0.001 -0.003 -0.008b -0.002 -0.007b
If in rural areas  0.011  0.003  0.015 -0.006  0.003  0.002
Hospital cost (log) -0.073b -0.009 -0.109b -0.100 -0.034 -0.180c
Ambulatory cost (log)  0.099b  0.018  0.104b  0.186b  0.047  0.202b
Selection equation y=0.886 y=0.886 y=0.887 y=0.7970 y=0.797 y=0.797
Income (log)  0.032b  0.031b  0.034b  0.046b  0.045b  0.049b
With health insurance  0.047b  0.047b  0.046b  0.064b  0.064b  0.063b
Total ambulatories  0.207b  0.213b  0.195b  0.213c  0.218c  0.205d
Total hospital beds -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004  0.001
Total physicians  0.008c  0.008c  0.007b  0.010  0.010  0.010
Female percentage  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.011  0.011  0.011
Race: mulatto -0.025b -0.025b -0.025b -0.035b -0.035b -0.035b
Race: black -0.028b -0.028b -0.028b -0.012 -0.012 -0.013
With children  0.041b  0.041b  0.042b -0.011 -0.011 -0.010
With older persons -0.015b -0.014b -0.016b  0.009  0.008  0.008
Highest level of education in household  0.006b  0.006b  0.006b  0.006b  0.005b  0.005b
Household size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
If in rural areas -0.043b -0.043b -0.042b -0.073b -0.073b -0.072b
Hospital cost (log)  0.049  0.052d  0.049b  0.077  0.080  0.074
Ambulatory cost (log)  0.114b  0.113b  0.116b  0.213b  0.167b  0.170b
Rho statistic -0.625b -0.554b -0.804b -0.484b -0.530b -0.704b
Observations 36 738 36 738 36 738 15 317 15 317 15 317
F-statistic 137.38b 102.07b 169.38b 52.24b 63.07b 51.41b
Source: IBGE (2000) and Ministry of Health of Brazil (2004).
a “y=” indicates the probability of the outcome
b Signifi cant at 1%,
c Signifi cant at 5%
d Signifi cant at 10%.
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variable changes as the independent variable changes by 
a small (infi nitesimal) amount, and they are calculated 
at the mean of the independent variable. For the binary 
variables, the effects were calculated as the discrete 
change in the dependent variable as the independent 
variable changes from 0 to 1. The signifi cance tests are 
based on Huber-White robust estimators of variance.
1.  Selection analysis
Households with higher income are more likely to 
receive health care, a fi nding similar to those of other 
Brazilian studies (Bahia, Costa and others, 2002; Farias 
and Melamed, 2003; Mendoza-Sassi, Béria and Barros, 
2003; Neri and Soares, 2002). Households with private 
health insurance are between 5% and 8% more likely to 
receive care, a similar result to Pinheiro and Travassos 
(1999), Mendoza-Sassi, Béria and Barros (2003), Neri 
and Soares (2002) and Viacava, Souza-Júnior and 
Szwarcwald (2005). Even in the context of a unifi ed 
health system free of charge, access to health care is 
constrained by household income and health insurance. 
Households with lower income and without private 
insurance are more likely to fi nd some of their health 
care needs unmet.
2. Determinants of catastrophic health 
expenditures (probit equation)
As expected, income has an important impact, as poorer 
households that seek care tend to spend more on health 
care as a percentage of income. Using SUS decreases 
the likelihood that a household will have catastrophic 
health expenditures by 47% (0.035/0.074, at the 40% 
threshold and using health-care need No. 1). As this 
variable refers to a period of only two weeks, the impact 
over a full month would be even higher.
Table 7 compares health-care expenditures as a 
percentage of total health spending for the different 
thresholds. The largest expenditure is on medicines, 
followed by health insurance premiums (obviously, not 
in the out-of-pocket threshold), dental care, hospital 
stays and doctor visits. It is worth noting the higher 
importance for hospital stays in the 40% threshold; if 
somebody in the household is hospitalized, there is a 
substantial increase in the likelihood that this threshold 
will be crossed.
Why do households need to spend money when 
they use SUS? One possible answer is that somebody 
in the household did not use SUS, whereas others 
did. The segmentation in the Brazilian private health 
insurance market (Pinto and Soranz, 2004; Bahia, 2001) 
—primarily covering households with higher income, 
which are less likely to use SUS— suggests that this 
situation is not very common. Another issue is that 
for the households that used SUS, and had a need for 
health care (need No. 1), 66% of the average health 
expenditures were for medicines, indicating that SUS 
coverage is particularly weak in this category (Nóbrega, 
Marques and others, 2007). SUS only dispenses 
medicines in public ambulatory units and pharmacies. 
If a patient, with a prescription from an SUS doctor, 
cannot obtain the medicine from the public facility, he 
or she needs to pay for it in a private pharmacy. This 
transfer of expenditures —from the public provider 
to the individual patient— is a signifi cant source of 
household health expenditures. This problem was also 
identifi ed by Silveira, Osório and Piola (2002), Lima-




(Percentages of total health spending)
Expenses Health care 20% (%) Health care 40% (%) Health care, out-of-pocket (%)
Medicines 41.6 42.3 53.6
Insurance premium 20.9 13.3 ---
Dental care 13.9 13.1 18.1
Hospital stays 7.5 13.5 7.5
Doctor visits 4.6 5.6 6.0
Glasses and lenses 3.9 2.9 5.5
Tests 3.2 4.0 3.9
Others 4.5 5.2 5.3
Source: IBGE (2000).
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Private health insurance is associated with a 
36% increase in the probability of catastrophic health 
expenditures (0.027/0.074, at the 40% threshold and 
using health-care need No. 1). This appears to be a 
counterintuitive result since insurance is supposed 
to be protective (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2005). Private 
insurance was not effective in reducing the household 
f inancial burden associated with health care; the 
fi nancial costs of premiums were more signifi cant than 
the expected reduction in fi nancial expenditures when 
health care was used. In fact, as shown in table 6, the 
private health insurance variable is non-signifi cant in 
the probit regression for the case of the out-of-pocket 
expenditure threshold. This fi nding indicates that health 
insurance has no impact on out-of-pocket expenses 
at the household level. Insurance is associated with 
signifi cant increases in health-care expenditures across 
all categories. Part of this increase is explained by the 
higher use of health care, but even if we restrict the 
calculation to households that used health care over the 
previous 14 days, the average total expenditure of those 
with insurance (251 reais) almost quadruples that of 
those without insurance (63 reais). Of this increase, 44% 
is attributable to the average health-care premium.
The importance of insurance premium costs in the 
total health-care budget was also observed by Silveira, 
Osório and Piola (2002) and Kilsztajn, Camara and 
Carmo (2002). The results above are also compatible 
with the observation by Viacava, Souza-Júnior and 
Szwarcwald (2005) that individuals with private 
health plans do not always use their insurance to pay 
for services. Farias (2001) explains the decision to 
purchase private health insurance in four ways: quality, 
access, reliability and social status. Public providers are 
perceived as being of lower quality, since doctors have 
limited time and resources for each consultation, there 
are longer waits before arranging an appointment, and 
there is no guarantee that a consultation in SUS will be 
possible at a given time. Farias also suggested that using 
a private provider might be seen as a strategy to maintain 
social status. Data from National Household Survey 
show that 80% of the insurance plans provide services 
through their own health-care networks and 88% have 
a network of contracted private providers. The doctors, 
hospitals, labs and other services in the fi rst group (own 
network) are clearly not accessible to a person who does 
not have health insurance, and the same is largely true 
for the second group (contracted network).
The motivation to buy private insurance is access 
to services of better quality and reliability (as the results 
from our selection equation regression indicate), not 
necessarily to reduce out-of-pocket expenditures, as 
shown in the results for our probit equation regression. 
Similarly, another possibility concerns intra-household 
distinctions, if the insurance does not cover all 
household members. If the individuals who do not have 
coverage would, nevertheless, avoid using SUS —given 
concerns about access, quality, and social status— they 
would have to bear the full fi nancial burden of private 
providers. This is a very important point, since in 40% 
of households with some health insurance coverage, at 
least one person is not covered by it.
VI
Conclusions
The Brazilian public health system provides a signifi cant 
reduction (47%) in a household’s probability of having 
catastrophic levels of health expenditures. This benefi t 
is more important for poorer households, which tend 
to rely more on the public system (Ribeiro, Barata 
and others, 2006). Other authors, including Ocké-Reis, 
Silveira and Andreazzi (2002), Diaz (2003) and Porto, 
Santos and Ugá (2006), have noted the protective 
impact of SUS. The high fi nancial burden associated 
with health care in Brazil, in comparison with other 
countries, can be attributed to those aspects of health 
care not well covered by the public system —most 
notably prescription and non-prescription drugs— and 
the defi ciencies in quantity, accessibility, quality and 
reliability of the public providers that lead many 
households to rely on the private sector, including the 
purchase of private health insurance (Bós, 2007).
In Brazil, for a large majority of the population, 
private health insurance does not provide effective 
fi nancial protection and does not reach the poorer 
households. While it is a tool to gain access to private 
providers, it does not reduce out-of-pocket expenditures 
at the household level and the premiums are relatively 
expensive. It follows, then, that private health 
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insurance is positively associated with catastrophic 
health expenditures.
Since 1998, health services provided under private 
plans have been subject to regulations, standards, 
monitoring and oversight by the National Agency for 
Supplementary Health. This new regulation has had 
some mandatory benefi ts, but it increased premium 
costs signifi cantly and still has limited impact (Farias 
and Melamed, 2003; Ocké-Reis, 2005; Fernandes, Pires 
and others, 2007). For the purposes of the present 
research, it can be assumed that the new regulations 
were not aimed at enhancing the fi nancial protection 
of health insurance clients, but at minimizing the 
practice of risk selection by insurance companies 
(Malta, Cecílio and others, 2004). Therefore, the results 
presented above are not expected to have changed 
signifi cantly since then. For instance, Ocké-Reis and 
Cardoso (2006) found that although the National 
Agency for Supplementary Health regulates the prices 
charged by some private health plans, the prices in this 
regulated sector increased more rapidly than health 
sector infl ation in the 2001-2005 period. Along similar 
lines, Diniz, Servo and others (2007) report that average 
inflation-adjusted household spending with health 
plan premiums was higher in 2003 than in 1996, and 
Andrade and Maia (2007) found very few differences 
in the determinants of the demand for private health 
insurance between 1998 and 2003.
Recommendations for changes in the Brazilian 
unifi ed health system include further improvements 
in the quantity, accessibility, quality, and reliability 
of the public providers. As the public health-care 
system improves, more households will choose it 
and fewer will be subjected to catastrophic levels of 
health expenditures. In addition, we found that the 
seeking of health care is constrained by the health-care 
infrastructure at the regional level, especially at the 
primary care level. Further investments in the number 
of primary care providers —both public and private— 
will enhance access and reduce the probability of 
health-care needs going unmet. Enhancing the public 
network will have the double benefit of not only 
providing access to care, but also improving fi nancial 
protection at the point of delivery. In terms of the 
public system’s direct impact on health spending, 
it is clear that the emphasis should be on a more 
extensive and appropriate provision of prescription and 
non-prescription drugs. The recent effort to provide 
non-branded drugs (generics) in public and private 
pharmacies is benefi cial as it reduces the costs to the 
public system in public pharmacies, and the costs to 
patients in private pharmacies, but the impact of this 
programme is still limited. Bertoldi, Barros and Hallal 
(2005) estimated that generics comprised only 4% of 
all medicines used. A stronger effort to enhance access 
to medicines is necessary, despite the associated high 
costs for the public system and the complexities of an 
effective control system. The way SUS provides most 
health-care services —in addition to using public 
providers, it reimburses private providers for services—
is inconsistent with its provision of medicines, which 
are available only through public dispensaries and 
pharmacies. At some point in the future, SUS should 
start reimbursing private pharmacies for dispensing 
medicines to its patients.
(Original: English)
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